Strategic pricing of financial options
AbstractThe mainstream model of option pricing is based on an exogenously given process of price movements. The implication of this assumption is that price movements are not affected by actions of market participants. However, if we assume that there are indeed impacts on the price movements it no longer possible to apply the standard pricing models. As a result we need an approach explaining interdependent actions. Game theory is in a position to offer proper olutions. This paper applies game theoretic concepts to determine option prices. Consequently, both the option price and the underlying´s expiration price are endogenously determined. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics in its series Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics with number 16/09.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
game theory; Nash equilibrium; option pricing; real option;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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