Business group, bank control, and large shareholders: An Analysis of German takeovers
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes in its series SFB 373 Discussion Papers with number 1998,64.
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gary Gorton & Matthias Kahl, 1999.
"Blockholder Identity, Equity Ownership Structures and Hostile Takeovers,"
Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers
99-19, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Gary Gorton & Matthias Kahl, 1999. "Blockholder Identity, Equity Ownership Structures, and Hostile Takeovers," NBER Working Papers 7123, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chirinko, Bob, 1999.
"Firm performance, financial institutions and corporate governance in the Netherlands,"
99E40, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
- Robert S. Chirinko & Hans van Ees & Harry Garretsen & Elmer Sterken, 1999. "Firm Performance, Financial Institutions and Corporate Governance in the Netherlands," CESifo Working Paper Series 210, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.