Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Trade policy lobbying in the European Union: Who captures whom?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Woll, Cornelia
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    What role do firms play in the making of EU trade policy? This article surveys the policy domain and lays out the instruments firms can employ to influence decisions on trade. It underlines that European trade policy is characterized by a high degree of institutional complexity, which firms have to manage in order to be successful. In particular, the European Commission works intensively to solicit business input in order to gain bargaining leverage vis-à-vis third countries and the EU member states. This reverse lobbying creates a two-channel logic of trade policy lobbying in the EU. Corporate actors have a very good chance of working closely with the European Commission if they can propose pan-European trade policy solutions. This can be either trade liberalization or EU-wide regulatory restrictions on trade. Demands for traditional protectionist measures, especially those that reveal national interest divergences, are difficult to defend at the supranational level. Protectionist lobbying therefore goes through the national route, with corporate actors working to block liberalization by affecting the consensus in the Council of Ministers. The chapter illustrates this two-channel logic by studying business-government interactions in agricultural trade, textiles and clothing, financial services, and telecommunication services. -- Welchen Einfluss haben Unternehmen auf die europäische Handelspolitik? Durch einen Überblick des Politikfelds analysiert der Artikel Instrumente, mit denen Unternehmen in der EU Lobbyismus betreiben können. Vielen Firmen werden allerdings nicht von sich aus aktiv. Im Gegenteil, die Europäische Kommission bemüht sich aktiv um die Zusammenarbeit der Unternehmen, da sie dadurch ihre Verhandlungsposition vis-à-vis Mitgliedsstaaten und Drittstaaten stärken kann. Dieses umgekehrte Lobbying hat Folgen für die Inhalte der Unternehmensforderungen im Bereich Handelspolitik. Wirtschaftliche Akteure können ein gutes Arbeitsverhältnis mit der Europäischen Kommission aufbauen, wenn sie gesamteuropäische Konzepte verfolgen, sei es Handelsliberalisierung oder EU-weite Regulierung. Nationaler Protektionismus kann europäische Entscheidungsfindung blockieren, so dass merkantilistische Anfragen an die nationalen Regierungen gerichtet werden müssen, die diese dann durch den Rat der Minister voranbringen können. Der Artikel illustriert diese zweigleisige Lobbyingstrategien in der Landwirtschaft, dem Textilhandel, dem Finanzdienstleistungssektor und der Telekommunikation.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/41643/1/550429662.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in its series MPIfG Working Paper with number 06/7.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgw:p0071

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Paulstr. 3, 50676 Köln
    Phone: + 49 (0) 221-2767-0
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.mpifg.de/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgw:p0071. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.