The Edgeworth, Cournot and Walrasian Cores
AbstractThree variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number ysm433.
Date of creation: 28 Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Market game; strategic market game; exchange economy; core; characteristic function;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-07-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-HPE-2004-07-20 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2004-07-18 (Microeconomics)
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