A Non-empty Core May Not Coincide with the Uncovered Set in Spatial Voting Situations
AbstractIn this note it is shown that in contradiction to the well-known claim in Cox (AJPS, 1987) (repeated in a number of subsequent works), the uncovered set in a spatial voting situation does not necessarily coincide with the core even when the core is non-empty.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of York in its series Discussion Papers with number 10/01.
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom
Phone: (0)1904 323776
Fax: (0)1904 323759
Web page: http://www.york.ac.uk/economics/
More information through EDIRC
spatial voting models; uncovered set; core; stable set;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-01-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-01-23 (Game Theory)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paul Hodgson).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.