Exoneree Compensation and Endogenous Plea Bargaining : Theory and Experiment

We provide a model of endogenous plea bargaining in which a prosecutor has discretion over her choice of plea bargains in response to a level of exoneree compensation mandated by the state. It is shown that an increase of the compensation may invite a sentence-maximizing prosecutor to offer a higher or lower plea bargain discount, depending on parameter values. We brought this model to the lab, finding that (i) when the exoneration process featured high accuracy, a higher level of exoneree compensation induced no significant change in the average plea bargain discounts but still reduced the number of innocent pleas without affecting the number of guilty individuals pleading guilty, and (ii) when the exoneration process was plagued with low accuracy, a higher level of exoneree compensation increased the average plea bargain discounts but had no significant influence on the number of innocent and guilty individuals pleading guilty. These findings suggest that exoneree compensation could be an effective policy tool in reducing innocent pleas and wrongful convictions when combined with accurate exoneration processes, and that a statute for exoneree compensation could be effective even when one cannot expect coordination between the prosecution office and the state legislative.