Why Timing Matters: Differential Effects of Uncertainty about the Outcome of Past versus Current Events

In strategic decision situations (e.g. in games) the outcome of decisions depend on all deci-sion-makers involved. Imagine such a situation, in which you make your choice simultane-ously with another player ('simultaneous'). Would that be different from knowing that your opponent chose before you, but still not knowing what s/he did ('sequential')? Contrary to game-theory, empirical evidence suggests that the two situations have different effects. We hypothesize that sequential game structures activate concepts of social interac-tions, which in turn increases individual's interpersonal trust and decreases individual's risk-aversion in situations of interdependence. In three experiments participants played a coordination game either simultaneously or sequentially. Additionally we manipulated thinking time (experiment 1), assessed participants perception of game-features (experiment 2) and manipulated activation of concepts like social interactions (experiment 3). Under standard instruction conditions the timing effect was repli-cated. The effect was eliminated when participants were asked to think about their opponent and when we had activated concepts of social interactions. Also perception of game-features differ depending on the order of unobserved moves. Results support our hypothesis that the timing effect is mediated by different cognitive processes which either intensify or diminish the focus on the other person. Classification-: