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Anreizprobleme in der Renten- und Krankenversicherung

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  • Börsch-Supan, Axel

    () (Sonderforschungsbereich 504)

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    Abstract

    Negative Anreizeffekte plagen alle Bereiche der Sozialpolitik. Diese negativen Anreizeffekte beziehen sich auf eine Zurücknahme des Arbeitsangebotes, eine Flucht aus der sozialversicherungspflichtigen Beschäftigung oder der Reduzierung von Ersparnissen. Diese negativen Anreizeffekte werden in diesem Beitrag an zwei Beispielen diskutiert: Der deutschen Gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung und der deutschen Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung, den beiden größten Sozialversicherungskomponenten. Der Beitrag vertieft nicht die theoretische Analyse der Anreizeffekte, sondern untersucht die empirische Relevanz der wirtschaftspolitisch wichtigsten Anreizwirkungen. Dabei werden Anreizeffekte erster Ordnung (Partizipation) und Anreizwirkungen II. Ordnung (moralisches Risiko) unterschieden.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number 98-44.

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    Length: 23 pages
    Date of creation: 16 May 1998
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:98-44

    Note: Financial Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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    Cited by:
    1. Udo Schneider, 2004. "Asymmetric Information and the Demand for Health Care - the Case of Double Moral Hazard," HEW 0409001, EconWPA.

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