Social Information Processing in Strategic Decision Making: Why Timing Matters

In strategic decision situations, as they are modeled in games, the outcome of decisions depend on all decision-makers involved. In such situations people make different decisions when moving simultaneously compared to moving sequentially without knowledge of earlier moves. This is called the timing-effect, which cannot be explained by classical game-theory (which is not predicted by game-theory). We hypothesize that pseudo-sequential game structures activate concepts of social interactions, which in turn increases individual’s interpersonal trust and decreases individual’s risk-aversion in situations of interdependence. Simultaneous game-structures are more likely to activate concepts of games-of-chances, as a consequence the possibility of an actual total loss is more salient. In four experiments participants played a coordination game either simultaneously or pseudo-sequentially. Additionally we manipulated processing time (experiment 1), assessed participants perception of game-features (experiment 2) and manipulated activation of concepts like social interactions (experiment 3). Results support our hypothesis that different cognitive processes, which either intensify or diminish the focus on the other person, mediate the timing effect. In experiment 4 we reversed the timing-effect by embedding the game into a competitive context.