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Financing and the Optimal Provision of Public Expenditure by Decentralized Agencies

Author

Listed:
  • Boadway, R
  • Horiba, I
  • Jha, R

Abstract

It has realized since Pigou (1947) that if public goods are financed by distortionary taxation, the marginal social cost of providing the public good will exceed the actual resource cost by the marginal deadweight cost of taxation.

Suggested Citation

  • Boadway, R & Horiba, I & Jha, R, 1996. "Financing and the Optimal Provision of Public Expenditure by Decentralized Agencies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 472, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:472
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    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/1995-1998/twerp472.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Axel Dreher & Kai Gehring & Christos Kotsogiannis & Silvia Marchesi, 2018. "Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: theory and evidence," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 243-265.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    PUBLIC GOODS ; PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ; TAXATION;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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