Labour-Managed Firms and Monopsony Power
AbstractMonopsony Power in the labour market is shown to have important consequences for comparisions between Illyrian labour-managed firm (LMF) and a profit maximising capitalist firm (CF) operating in the same markets with the same technology. If the CF earns positive profits then workers earn more in the LMF than in the CF, and the level of employment in the LMF may be greater or less than in the CF. Monopsony power is also seen to have interesting implications for models of membership contraction in LMF's.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 224.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1982
Date of revision:
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