The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation (updated version)
AbstractAll existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions have one of two restrictions: they either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to special agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. An important open question is whether judgment aggregation faces any serious impossibilities without these restrictions. Here we prove the first impossibility theorem without systematicity that applies to all standard agendas: there exists no judgment aggregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective rationality, anonymity and a new condition called unbiasedness. For many agendas, anonymity can be weakened. Applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggregation represented in the judgment aggregation model, our result implies that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain depends only on a single individual.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0510001.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2005
Date of revision: 31 Oct 2005
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://18.104.22.168
judgment aggregation; discursive dilemma; formal logics; impossibility theorem; unbiasedness; systematicity; agendas;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-10-08 (All new papers)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bradley, Richard & Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007.
"Aggregating causal judgements,"
001, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.