The problem of succession
AbstractThe self-interested ruler will not name a successor. Instead, he will prefer to rely on a tacit rule of succession, in which longevity confers legitimacy. [JEL D72, D81]
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0105001.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 06 May 2001
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - Scientific Word 3.51; prepared on Compaq Presario 1200; to print on HP; pages: 15; figures: included
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succession leadership organization;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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