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Unanimity Rule Constitutions

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Author Info

  • Hans Gersbach

    (University of Heidelberg)

  • Ulrich Erlenmaier

    (University of Heidelberg)

Abstract

In this paper, we show that the shortcomings of the unanimity rule can be alleviated by complementing it with the following constitutional principles: broad packages with many public projects can only be proposed once in a legislative term, the agenda setter needs to pay the highest taxes he is proposing, as well as a ban on subsidies. We show that such democratic constitutions yield efficient public project provision.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/pe/papers/0004/0004007.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0004007.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 04 Aug 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0004007

Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on UNIX ; to print on PostScript; pages: 16; figures: .
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: Unanimity rule; incomplete social contract; constitutional treatment rules; provision of public projects;

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