Unanimity Rule Constitutions
AbstractIn this paper, we show that the shortcomings of the unanimity rule can be alleviated by complementing it with the following constitutional principles: broad packages with many public projects can only be proposed once in a legislative term, the agenda setter needs to pay the highest taxes he is proposing, as well as a ban on subsidies. We show that such democratic constitutions yield efficient public project provision.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0004007.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 04 Aug 2000
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on UNIX ; to print on PostScript; pages: 16; figures: .
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Unanimity rule; incomplete social contract; constitutional treatment rules; provision of public projects;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-02-14 (All new papers)
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