The Case for Managed Judges: Learning from Japan after the Political Upheaval of 1993
AbstractAlthough the executive branch appoints Japanese Supreme Court justices as it does in the United States, a personnel office under the control of the Supreme Court rotates lower court Japanese judges through a variety of posts. This creates the possibility that politicians might indirectly use the postings to reward or punish judges. For forty years, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) controlled the legislature and appointed the Supreme Court justices who in turn controlled the careers of these lower-court judges. In 1993, it temporarily lost control. We use regression analysis to examine whether the end of the LDP’s electoral lock changed the court’s promotion system, and find surprisingly little change. Whether before or after 1993, the Supreme Court used the personnel office to 'manage' the careers of lower court judges. The result: uniform and predictable judgments that economize on litigation costs by facilitating out-of-court settlements.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 0512002.
Date of creation: 12 Dec 2005
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judges; Japan; supreme court; political economy;
Other versions of this item:
- J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 2005. "The Case for Managed Judges: Learning from Japan after the Political Upheaval of 1993," Working Papers 2005-03, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- K - Law and Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2005-12-20 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-12-20 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-12-20 (Regulation)
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