“... or should have known ...”: On Foreseeability and Paradox in Law and Economics
AbstractThe economic analysis of law, as a subdiscipline of economics, has traditionally been about analyzing the efficiency properties of different rules for assigning known quanta of damages. This work (from the author's NYU doctoral dissertation) focuses on the processes by which agents in legal institutions come to know what they have been assumed to know when the economist models their behavior. This essay suggests that mainstream Law and Economics’ approach to conceptualizing unforeseeable events either contradicts some of its specific conclusions about liability rules or renders it incapable of applying its traditional efficiency criteria to the study of comparative legal systems. An alternative to the efficiency criterion is discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 0004003.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 08 May 2000
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - WordPerfect; prepared on PC-Compatible; to print on Any PC-Compatible (Canon Bubble); pages: 33; figures: None. I invite your comments and suggestions; this paper was the third chapter of my 1998 NYU doctoral dissertation.
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Posner foreseeability equilibrium strict liability Austrian;
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- K - Law and Economics
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