This paper provides an in-depth normative analysis in two parts: 1) ECB monetary policy focusing on credibility, accountability, transparency, flexibility, and both goal and instrument independence; 2) Theoretical analysis of discrepancies of the Stability and Growth Pact rules vs. discretionary framework that is comprised of the conventional view on budget deficits and how budget deficit targeting creates a procyclical and endogenous policy.
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Length: 30 pages Date of creation: 22 Feb 2004 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpif:0402004
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F3 - International Economics - - International Finance F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
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