The Deadlist of Games: A Model of the Duel
AbstractRecent historical research indicates that ritualistic dueling had a rational basis. Basically, under certain social and economic conditions, individuals must fight in order to maintain their personal credit and social standing. A model of the duel, therefore, can be constructed. We model the duel as a two--players sequential game. This paper shows that the optimal strategy of each player depends upon the value of three parameters, namely, ``cost of fighting,'' ``cost of shame'', and ``value of courage.''
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series General Economics and Teaching with number 0207001.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 09 Aug 2002
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Note: Type of Document - pef; prepared on pc; pages: 14 ; figures: request from author
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teaching; game theory; general economics;
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- A - General Economics and Teaching
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-08-19 (All new papers)
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