Equilibrium Outcomes of Repeated Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games
AbstractWe consider repeated two-person, zero-sum games in which the preferences in the repeated game depend on the stage-game preferences, although not necessarily in a time-consistent way. We assume that each player's repeated game payoff function at each period of time is strictly increasing on the stage game payoffs and that the repeated game is itself a zero-sum game in every period. Under these assumptions, we show that an outcome is a subgame perfect outcome if and only if all its components are Nash equilibria of the stage game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0402003.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 11 Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on winxp; to print on general; pages: 14; figures: 1. none
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Repeated two-person; zero-sum games; time-inconsistent preferences;
Other versions of this item:
- Carmona, Guilherme, 2002. "Equilibrium Outcomes in Repeated Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp419, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-02-15 (All new papers)
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