Is Batting Last an Advantage?

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Is Batting Last an Advantage?

Author Info

Theodore L. Turocy (Texas A&M University)

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Theodore L. Turocy

Abstract

This paper applies the theory of zero-sum stochastic games to assess the validity of baseball's ancient wisdom that batting last confers a strategic advantage. Results from numerical calculation of Markov perfect equilibrium suggest that the team that bats last will have an advantage if in fact the offense has, in some sense, more useful strategic actions available than the defense. An example is provided where the advantage depends on details of the teams playing. Regardless of which team has the advantage, all calculations indicate the advantage is negligible in magnitude.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0309002.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 04 Sep 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0309002

Note: Type of Document - TeXmacs; prepared on Linux; to print on PostScript; pages: 24 ; figures: none
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Computational Techniques
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2003-09-08 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2003-09-08 (Game Theory)

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.

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