The Core Can Be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps
AbstractThis paper strengthens the result of Sengupta and Sengupta (1996). We show that for the class of games with nonempty cores the core can be reached in a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this: the boundedness holds for any two imputations with an indirect dominance relation between them.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0202001.
Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 04 Feb 2002
Date of revision: 04 Feb 2002
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 8 ; figures: 1 - included. Work in progress, comments welcome!
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dynamic cooperative game; indirect dominance; core.;
Other versions of this item:
- László Á. Kóczy, 2002. "The Core can be accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0218, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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