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The Core Can Be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps

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Author Info
László Á. Kóczy (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)

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Abstract

This paper strengthens the result of Sengupta and Sengupta (1996). We show that for the class of games with nonempty cores the core can be reached in a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this: the boundedness holds for any two imputations with an indirect dominance relation between them.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0202/0202001.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0202001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 04 Feb 2002
Date of revision: 04 Feb 2002
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0202001

Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 8 ; figures: 1 - included. Work in progress, comments welcome!
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: dynamic cooperative game; indirect dominance; core.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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