IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wop/ohstfi/_019.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Teams, Repeated Tasks, and Implicit Incentives

Author

Listed:

Abstract

This paper provides an explanation for why incentive contracts that are muted (compared to incentive contracts derived from standard agency models) may be effective in motivating team members. By having the team repeat a task in a second period, the explicit incentives that need to be provided to the team members can be partially substituted by implicit incentives that the team members provide to each other. The optimal two-period contract provides the managers with incentives to monitor each other and a means of punishing free riders.

Suggested Citation

  • Anil Arya & John Fellingham & Jonathan Glover., "undated". "Teams, Repeated Tasks, and Implicit Incentives," Corporate Finance & Organizations _019, Ohio State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:wop:ohstfi:_019
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/~arya/jaer.doc
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:ohstfi:_019. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Krichel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dfohsus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.