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Red Executives: Are They Winners or Losers in Russia's Economic Reforms?

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Author Info
Susan J. Linz

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Abstract

Based on panel data collected from more than 2,000 firms in Moscow, Rostov, Volgograd and Novosibirsk between 1992 and 1995, red executives are evaluated in terms of their ability to maintain or expand production and/or employment, as well as their ability to maintain their position. With respect to production and employment, red executives more often than not are losers. With respect to job security, red executives are winners. Whether red executives are winners or losers does not depend significantly on ownership structure or location. It does vary significantly by industry and firm size.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number 66.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1997
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Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:1997-66

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