Corruption and Reform
AbstractCountries making the transition to a market economy often experience an increase in corruption along with an increase in growth. This observation is puzzling in the context of current models, which emphasize the destructive nature of corruption. We present a model of corruption and reform which shows that under some circumstances a particular gradualist reform strategy is optimal. This strategy consists of temporarily relaxing control of corruption in order to provide a windfall to existing bureaucrats, thereby gaining their support for a reform effort that will ultimately reduce the distortions stemming from bureaucratic power. Thus, a one-time surge of corruption can be a prelude to a permanently reduced level of corruption in the future, which provides the incentive for high current growth. We illustrate our point with examples from the recent Chinese reform.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number 55.
Date of creation: 01 Jun 1996
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corruption; transition; reform; property rights;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- P21 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
- P - Economic Systems
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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- John Fernald & John H. Rogers, 2002.
"Puzzles In The Chinese Stock Market,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
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