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Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation : Evidence from Chinese Cities

Author

Listed:
  • Xu,Gang
  • Xu,L. Colin
  • Si,Ruichao

Abstract

Tournament competition is viewed as motivating bureaucrats in promoting growth. This paperexamines how this incentive leads to economic performance manipulation. Using data from Chinese cities, the analysisshows that performance exaggeration increases over the course of the first term of the top bureaucrat, peaking inthe last year of his or her term. Winning a tournament competition is behind this performance manipulation:political rivals reinforce each other in exaggerating performance, and political competition intensifies thetendency for manipulation. Performance exaggeration leads to higher chances of promotion, but the ratchet effect (thatis, better performance today leading to a higher target tomorrow) and the potential to blame predecessors inducerestraint. A good local institutional environment also restrains performance manipulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu,Gang & Xu,L. Colin & Si,Ruichao, 2022. "Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation : Evidence from Chinese Cities," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9938, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9938
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