Regulation, institutions and commitment : the Jamaican telecommunications sector
AbstractThe Jamaican telecommunications sector today is much more dynamic than it was before and provides much better service. There is widespread skepticism about the current regulatory framework, which is criticized for encouraging a tight telecommunications monopoly, little administrative discretion, and continous price adjustments to satisfy what many see as a high rate of return requirement. But the authors suggest that the regulatory framework is a"second-best"alternative, a pragmatic response to The Jamaican's institutional realities. The authors analyze why the reforms of the late 1980s took the form they did, and whether they could have been better. They find that the changing nature of regulatory institutions, ownership arrangements, and sector performance in the past 50 years is traceable to intense contracting problems between firms or interest groups and the government. Attempts to resolves these contracting problems have continuously constrained the government's (and firms) ability to implement efficient pricing schemes. In the abstract, The Jamaican's regulatory structure looks inefficient. In the context of The Jamaican's political system, politics, judiciary, bureaucracy, and interest groups, the regulatory framework developed in the late 1980s emerges as a fairly pragmatic, welfare-improving set of policies. Perhaps it could have been better, but its current design reflects basic commitment problems the government has with public utilities.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1362.
Date of creation: 31 Oct 1993
Date of revision:
Public Sector Economics&Finance; Economic Theory&Research; National Governance; Environmental Economics&Policies; ICT Policy and Strategies;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Galal, Ahmed & Nauriyal, Bharat, 1995. "Regulating telecommunications in developing countries : outcomes, incentives, and commitment," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1520, The World Bank.
- Che, Jiahua & Qian, Yingyi, 1998.
"Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate Governance: Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 1-23, April.
- Jiahua Che & Yingyi Qian, . "Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate Governance: Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises," Working Papers 97043, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Jiahua Che & Yingyi Qian, 1998. "Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate Governance: Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 59, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller, 2004. "The Institutions of Regulation," Working Papers 67, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2004.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.