We analyze the effect of consumer information on firm pricing in a model where consumers search for prices and matches with products. We consider two types of consumers. Uninformed consumers do not know in advance their match values with firms, whereas informed consumers do. Prices are lower the greater the proportion of uninformed consumers. Hence uninformed consumers exert a positive externality on the others, in contrast to standard results. This leads to socially excessive investment in gathering prior information when aggregate demand is price-sensitive.
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Paper provided by University of Virginia, Department of Economics in its series Virginia Economics Online Papers with number
338.
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Simon P. Anderson & Regis Renault, 2006.
"Advertising Content,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 93-113, March.
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Simon P. Anderson & Régis Renault, 2006.
"comparative Advertising,"
THEMA Working Papers
2006-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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