Profit Maximization, Relative Prices, and the Maximization of Shareholders' Real Wealth
AbstractGeneral equilibrium models of oligopolistic competition give rise to relative prices only without determining the price level. It is well known that the choice of a numÃ©raire or, more generally, of a normalization rule converting relative prices into absolute prices entails drastic consequences for the Nash equilibria. In this paper we show that, given a firm has chosen a particular profit function as its objective, profit maximization can be expressed in such a way that it depends on relative prices only. However, the choice of such an objective function need not be in the interest of the shareholders. This problem is overcome by relating the profits of a firm to the expenditure of its shareholders. We define the maximization of shareholders' real wealth as the objective of a firm. This concept is based on profits and on shareholders' expenditures. Moreover, it depends on relative prices only rather than on arbitrary price normalizations, which cannot be derived from the economic structure of the model. As a result there is no need for absolute prices in the theory of imperfect competition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number vie9503.
Date of creation: May 1995
Date of revision:
Note: Replaced by working paper 9706.
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Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl
Other versions of this item:
- Egbert Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 1995. "Profit Maximization, Relative Prices, and the Maximization of Shareholders' Real Wealth," Discussion Papers 95-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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- Dufwenberg, Martin & Heidhues, Paul & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedel, Frank & Sobel, Joel, 2008.
"Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6815, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Paul Heidhues & Georg Kirchsteiger & Frank Riedel & Joel Sobel, 2011. "Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 613-639.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Paul Heidhues & Georg Kirchsteiger & Frank Riedel & Joel Sobel, 2011. "Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/149598, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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