Who Bears the Full Costs of Children?
AbstractThis paper measures how the costs of children are shared between the father and the mother by estimating a gender specific demand system related to the demand for market goods, household products and leisure within a collective approach. The estimates illustrate how the intra-household distribution of resources varies across households with and without children and how wages and non-labor income affect the allocation rule in both one-earner and double-earner households. In the presence of a child, both parents, but mothers especially, increase their involvement in home production at the expense of the enjoyment of leisure. This commitment decreases as the child gets older. In general, mothers control less than half of the household resources, while they bear more than half of the cost of maintaining a child.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Verona, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 01/2010.
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
cost of children; collective demand system; intra-household allocation; household production; full income; sharing rule;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-08-06 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin Browning & Jens Bonke, 2006. "Allocation within the household: direct survey evidence," Economics Series Working Papers 286, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Martina Menon & Federico Perali & Luca Piccoli, 2012. "The Passive Drinking Effect: A Collective Demand Application," Working Papers 05/2012, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
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