It is often argued that, first, the decision criterion of antitrust authorities should be total social welfare and that, second, mergers increasing the value of this criterion but ending with lower consumer surplus should be allowed in the name of efficiency gains realized by merging firms. This paper studies merger control by a government with, first, preferences over wealth distribution among agents (weights to put on consume surplus and firms profit) and, second, imperfect redistribution tools. It shows that in such a case merger policy can not be parted off redistribution policy.
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Paper provided by University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
2006_31.