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On the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses: An Economic Analysis

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Author Info
Chung, T.Y.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics in its series UWO Department of Economics Working Papers with number 9102.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9102

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Postal: Department of Economics, Reference Centre, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
Phone: 519-661-2111 Ext.85228
Web page: http://economics.uwo.ca/econref/WorkingPapers/

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Related research
Keywords: contracts ; competition ; economic models;

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  1. Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1997. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," NBER Working Papers 5007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Feess, Eberhard & Gerfin, Michael & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2008. "Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer," IZA Discussion Papers 3834, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  3. Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramón & Matutes, Carmen, 1999. "Golden Cages for Showy Birds: Optimal Switching Costs in Labour Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2070, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gerd Muehlheusser, 2006. "Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 2367, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  5. Fumagalli, Chiara & Motta, Massimo & Rønde, Thomas, 2009. "Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion," CEPR Discussion Papers 7240, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jihong Lee, 2005. "Incomplete Information, Renegotiation, and Breach of Contract," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(5), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  7. Stefano Comino & Antonio Nicolò & Piero Tedeschi, 2005. "Termination Clauses in Partnerships," Industrial Organization 0509007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Michele Moretto & Gianpaolo Rossini, 1996. "Profit sharing regulation and repeated bargaining with a shut-down option," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 339-368, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2010-3-2.

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