Multiple-cost sharing rules often coexist in seemingly identical environments. We use shared irrigation costs as a context for examining the extent to which the structural environment explains the selection of a cost sharing rule. We find that environmental factors that?induce greater dependence on the cooperation of others, influence majority interests, create difficulties for interpersonal utility comparisons, or impact notions of “fairness”?all have impressive explanatory power. These results present the first formal empirical analysis of the manner in which structural features influence the actual ost-sharing choices of economic agents.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Utah State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
2001-08.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models