Involuntary unemployment and non-compensating wage differentials in an experimental labour market
AbstractIn this paper, the authors report the results of a series of efficiency wage experiments. Some of the key predictions of the efficiency wage hypothesis are qualitatively confirmed by the data: higher wages caused a reduction in shirking; firms offered contracts which exhibited positive job rents; firms offered systematically different wages and job rents which gave rise to noncompensating income differentials; and endogenous involuntary unemployment occurred. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/5917.
Date of creation: Jan 1996
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: The Economic Journal (1996) v.106 nÂ° 434,p.106-121
Other versions of this item:
- Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedl, Arno, 1996. "Involuntary Unemployment and Non-compensating Wage Differentials in an Experimental Labour Market," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 106-21, January.
- Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedl, Arno, 1996. "Involuntary unemployment and non-compensating wage differentials in an experimental labour market," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-16459, Maastricht University.
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