Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 92-14.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Phone: (319) 335-0829
Fax: (319) 335-1956
Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/
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game theory ; economic models;
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- Chong Lim Kim & Yong-Gwan Kim, 1993. "The Evolution of Obedience Norms in the Repeated Carrot-and-the Stick Game," Game Theory and Information 9311001, EconWPA.
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