On Finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's stable sets in spatial voting games
AbstractI present a proof on finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's majority stable sets in multidimensional voting games in the case of differentiable utility functions on Rk and 3 players. The central hypothesis is based on a light separation property which is real common for family of functions on R^k. Under the same hypotheses, the majority core is empty except for degenerate cases.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia in its series Quaderni DSEMS with number 16-2009.
Date of creation: Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Stable sets; Voting game; Convexity.;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-09-26 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2009-09-26 (Game Theory)
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