The Economics of Criminal Procedure
AbstractCriminal procedure concerns the rules regarding the treatment of criminal defendants during the time from their arrest until the determination of a final verdict. From an economic perspective, the goal of this process is to achieve the most accurate determination of guilt at the lowest possible cost. The process encompasses plea bargaining, the bail system, rules regarding the determination of guilt at trial, and appeal. Criminal procedure also affects deterrence because it ultimately determines the expected punishment imposed on offenders. However, uncertainty in enforcement necessarily leads to a conflict between the goals of deterrence and error avoidance.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2007-24.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Note: I acknowledge the insightful comments of Richard Adelstein.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Connecticut 341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063
Phone: (860) 486-4889
Fax: (860) 486-4463
Web page: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/
More information through EDIRC
Criminal procedure; plea bargaining; rules of evidence;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Mongrain, Steeve & Roberts, Joanne, 2009.
"Plea bargaining with budgetary constraints,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 8-12, March.
- Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, 2007. "Plea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints," Discussion Papers dp07-07, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
- Joanne Roberts & Steeve Mongrain, 2008. "Plea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints," Working Papers 2008-06, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 29 Jan 2008.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kasey Kniffin).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.