Comment on: Electoral Contests, Incumbency Advantages, and Campaign Finance
AbstractThis paper completes Meirowitz (2008) by analyzing the effect of a cap on political campaign spending in an environment where voters have initial preferences over political candidates. The policy implications are starkly different from the previously analyzed case where voters are indifferent between candidates in the absence of campaign spending. We find that a spending cap always favors the a priori popular candidate. This result holds irrespective of whether it is the incumbent or the challenger who is able to more effectively generate and spend contributions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School Of Economics, University College Dublin in its series Working Papers with number 200913.
Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Campaign Finance Reform; Spending Limit; Expenditure Limit; Incumbency Advantage; Clean Elections;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-09-26 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2009-09-26 (Positive Political Economics)
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