Screening When Some Agents are Non-Strategic: Does a Monopoly Need to Exclude? (Technical Supplement)
AbstractTechnical supplement to the paper forthcoming in Rand Journal of Economics.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Vancouver School of Economics in its series Microeconomics.ca working papers with number severinov-05-12-26-01-26-15.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 26 Dec 2005
Date of revision: 26 Dec 2005
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Web page: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/
mechanism design; screening; honesty; bounded rationality.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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