Network Cooperation and incentives within online communities
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to understand the rationale of cooperation within online sharing communities. How can we explain the extent of cooperative interactions between anonymous distant Internet users ? We build a game theoretic framework to study the exchange of services within virtual community like in a peer-to-peer network. We show that the coexistence of contributors and free-riders is often a stable situation. We also examine the optimal incentive mechanisms to stimulate contributions by community members.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) with number 200601.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
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Postal: CREM (UMR CNRS 6211) - Faculty of Economics, 7 place Hoche, 35065 Rennes Cedex - France
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2006-05-22 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MKT-2006-05-21 (Marketing)
- NEP-NET-2006-05-26 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2006-05-23 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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