Gregarious Behaviour of Evasive Prey
AbstractLecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004We model the formation of a herd as a game between a predator and a prey population. The predator receives some information about the composition of the herd when he chases it, but receives no information when he chases a solitary individual. We describe situations in which the herd and its leader are in conflict and in which the leader bows to the herdâ€™s wish but where this is not to the benefit of the herd.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 9.
Date of creation: Jun 2004
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-10-29 (All new papers)
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