Characterizing Stable One-to-One Matchings under Interdependent Preferences
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0806.
Date of creation: Jul 2008
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- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:33:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2008.
"Rationalizability of One-to-One Matchings with Externalities,"
0807, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
- Ismail Saglam & Ayþe Mumcu, 2008. "Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(33), pages 1-8.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ismail Saglam).
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