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Board's Monitoring and Retention of Sub-standard and Powerless CEOs

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Author Info

  • Meg Sato

    (Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University)

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    Abstract

    Do corporate boards look after shareholder interests? This paper shows that CEO replacement may exhibit excessive inertia, in favor of the incumbent board of directors. I show that even when there is no relationship between the board of directors and CEO, or no threat of the CEO.s power over the board of directors, there is a case in which the board wants to keep sub-standard CEOs.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-711.

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    Length: 10pages
    Date of creation: Jan 2010
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2010cf711

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