IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tin/wpaper/20010084.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Impact of Lobbying on the Allocation of Political Authority

Author

Listed:
  • Sonia Falconieri

    (CREED, University of Amsterdam)

Abstract

This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature ascomposed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. Thefloor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented.The policy outcome is ex ante unknown but the committee has anexpertise to learn the payoff pattern of the feasible policies.In this context, we investigate the impact of lobbying on the optimalallocation of political authority ( agenda control) between the floorand the standing committee.The allocation of the agenda control is here described as the choicebetween two alternative legislative rules: open versus closed rule.We show that, in presence of lobbying, the effectiveness of a closedrule as an incentive device towards the committee is noticeablyreduced while the costs imposed to the floor are higher. As aconsequence, we find that a closed rule is never an optimal choicefor the floor.

Suggested Citation

  • Sonia Falconieri, 2001. "The Impact of Lobbying on the Allocation of Political Authority," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-084/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20010084
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/01084.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rocco Ciciretti & Simone Meraglia & Gustavo Piga, 2011. "Capture, Politics and Antitrust Effectiveness," CEIS Research Paper 208, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 05 Apr 2013.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lobbying; Procedure Rule; Open/Closed Rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20010084. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tinbenl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.