This paper analyses competition between direct and intermediated trade. We show that a middleman's supply and demand depend on both his bid and ask prices if sellers and buyers have the alternative of trading directly. Multiplicity also prevails. Direct trade does not constrain the market power of a middleman unless it is frictionless. Our results suggest that the timing of disintermediation is likely to be sub-optimal and have implications, more generally, for the analysis many functional goods markets where there are parallel or alternative trade channels for the same good.
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Paper provided by Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics in its series Economics Technical Papers with number
965.
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