The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry: What Would More Vigorous Competition Look Like?
AbstractThe residential real estate brokerage industry represents a troubling instance of false appearances. Though the numbers of sales agents and brokerage firms, plus easy entry, would appear to offer the promise of vigorous competition, actual practices in the industry have caused reality to fall substantially short of the potential. After recounting the history of the transition of the securities industry from fixed and non-competitive stock brokerage commissions to far more vigorous competition, I draw on that experience to describe what vigorous competition in the residential real estate brokerage industry would look like. I also suggest public policy measures that would help bring about more vigorous competition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 06-06.
Date of creation: 2006
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Other versions of this item:
- White, Lawrence J., 2006. "The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry: What Would More Vigorous Competition Look Like?," Working paper 102, Regulation2point0.
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-02-03 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-02-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-URE-2007-02-03 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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