Market Segmentation, Market Integration and Tacit Collusion
AbstractThis paper shows that moving from market segmentation to market integration (i.e. firms can no longer discriminate among markets) has anti-competitive effects in a repeated game setting in which a simple trigger strategy is the enforcement strategy. In particular, we show that two countries can never both experience pro-competitive gains and that two similar countries always both experience anti-competitive effects from market integration.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University in its series Discussion Papers with number dp98-06.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada
Web page: http://www.sfu.ca/economics.html
More information through EDIRC
Postal: Working Paper Coordinator, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada
Other versions of this item:
- Constantin Colonescu & Nicolas Schmitt, 2003. "Market Segmentation, Market Integration, and Tacit Collusion," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 175-192, February.
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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