Optimal Partnership Contracts: Foundation and Duality
AbstractWe use the duality in linear programming to solve the problem of optimal contracts with moral hazards. We show the importance of allowing the partners to throw away outputs under some contingencies. A two-step procedure is used to find the optimal contracts. The first step minimizes the loss from undistributed outputs, and in the second step, a second best solution is found. A characterization of the optimal contracts in 2-by-2-by-2 partnership games is o?ered. Such contracts implement an optimal strategy profile which either has no incentive cost to implement or is near a pure strategy profile.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR) in its series IEPR Working Papers with number 05.11.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2004
Date of revision:
optimal sharing contracts; partnership games; moral hazards; duality; linear programming;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2005-04-03 (Business Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2005-04-03 (Microeconomics)
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