A Computational Approach to Proving Uniqueness in Dynamic Games
AbstractDynamic games are used to analyze dynamic strategic interactions. While existence of equilibrium can often be proved by conventional methods, uniqueness is much more difficult to establish. If a game reduces to solving a system of polynomial equations, then one could use algorithms for finding all solutions to such systems to establish if equilibrium was unique. We study a common type of game where equilibrium can be analyzed as a sequence of small games and apply an all solutions algorithm to each such game
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 with number 412.
Date of creation: 11 Nov 2005
Date of revision:
nash equilibrium; multivariate polynomials;
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- Ron N. Borkovsky & Ulrich Doraszelski & Yaroslav Kryukov, . "A User''s Guide to Solving Dynamic Stochastic Games Using the Homotopy Method," GSIA Working Papers 2009-E23, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
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