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К Теории Опекаемых Благ. Неэффективные И Эффективные Равновесия
[On the Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria]

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Author Info

  • Rubinstein Alexander Yakovlevich

Abstract

Статья посвящена некоторым аспектам теории опекаемых благ в контексте эффективного и неэффективного равновесия. В работе представлены особенности опекаемых благ, их связь с провалами рынка, сформулирована гипотеза об их соотношении с формированием неэффективных равновесий по Нэшу. Ключевой задачей исследования является анализ возможностей перехода от неэффективного равновесия к Парето-оптимальному равновесию по Нэшу для опекаемых благ посредством трансформации институциональной среды. В статье содержится анализ общественных мотиваций институциональной модернизации, а также условий равновесия в обобщенной модели Линдаля-Викселля для опекаемых благ. Кроме того, рассмотрены некоторые прикладные аспекты теории опекаемых благ применительно к социальной политике. The article researches selected aspects of the patronized goods theory in the context of efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods, their connection with market failures, and formulates the hypothesis of their correlation with inefficient Nash equilibria formation. The key aim of the research is the analysis of opportunities for transforming the inefficient equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the general Lindahl-Wicksell model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Economics in its series Working papers with number y:2011:a:pru175:n:1.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 02 Feb 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, 2011, no 3, pp. 65-87.
Handle: RePEc:rua:wpaper:y:2011:a:pru175:n:1

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Keywords: Patronized goods; normative interests; market failures; public goods; merit goods; Baumol economy; Economic Sociodynamics; efficient equilibrium; inefficient equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; institutional modernization; equilibrium model for patronized goods; subsidies; transfers; social priorities;

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