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Институциональные Условия Достижения Политического Компромисса В Теориях Демократии
[Institutional conditions for achievment of political compromise in theories of democracy]

Author

Listed:
  • Симон Марк Евгеньевич
  • Фурман Екатерина Дмитриевна

Abstract

В статье рассматриваются ключевые подходы к концептуализации политического комп ромисса. Рассматриваются модели демократии и соответствующий институ-циональный дизайн обеспечения оптимального уровня политического участия. При этом политический компромисс понимается неодинаково. Он может отождествляться с консенсусом, когда акцент делается на единодушных решениях, или же исходить из допущения политического противостояния, при котором тем не менее возможно достижение modus vivendi. Особое внимание авторы уделяют теории консоциативной демократии, предлагающей способ решения конфликтов в многосоставных обществах The paper reviews the key approaches to the conceptualization of political compromise. Each model of democracy - aggregative (G. Almond), deliberative (J. Rawls, J. Habermas), consociate (A. Lijphart) and agonistic (Ch.Mouffe) suggests its own institutional design to ensure an optimal level of political participation. In the theories which describe these mod-els, political compromise is understood in a different ways: in some, it is identified with the consensus, the other are based on an assumption that political contestation is inevitable, which nevertheless makes the achievement of modus vivendi possible. The authors pay par-ticular attention to the theory of consociational democracy, developed by Arendt Lijphart. This theory proposes a way to solve conflicts in the multipartite societies

Suggested Citation

  • Симон Марк Евгеньевич & Фурман Екатерина Дмитриевна, 2015. "Институциональные Условия Достижения Политического Компромисса В Теориях Демократии [Institutional conditions for achievment of political compromise in theories of democracy]," Working papers y:2005:a:psi472,pfu128:n:, Institute of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:rua:wpaper:y:2005:a:psi472,pfu128:n:1
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    compromise; consensus; political institutions; political participation; democracy; power sharing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other

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